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The Tensions Between Integration
and School Reform
by JOHN A. POWELL*
"Blacks have never been, and are not now, really considered to
be citizens here."1
I. Introduction
All discussions of education are at essence discussions of
citizenship. The Supreme Court has identified "the objectives of
public education as the inculcation of fundamental values necessary
for the maintenance of a democratic political system."2 More, these
are discussions on the ability of members of all races to participate
fully in democratic structures, and critiques of the formation and
sustenance of racially just democratic structures. Molly Townes
O'Brien has written that the efficacy of education could be measured
by its capacity to "instill moral character, critical thinking ability, and
cultural literacy," but it is studied, instead, in terms of "standardized
test scores, drop-out rates, or occupational attainment. 3  It is
integration; in terms of not merely parity but in terms of the creation
of a just space for the constitution of the self, education, and
democracy; that must be the measure for the success of our schools.
It may seem odd asserting that integration is the appropriate measure
* john a. powell is the Marvin J. Sonosky Chair in Law and Public Policy,
University of Minnesota Law School; Executive Director, Institute on Race and Poverty.
1. JAMES BALDWIN, THE EVIDENCE OFTHINGS NOT SEEN 31 (1985).
2. Kevin Brown, Equal Protection Challenges to the Use of Racial Classifications to
Promote Integrated Public Elementary and Secondary Student Enrollments, 34 AKRON L.
REV. 37,59 (2000) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,871-72,876 (1982)).
3. Molly Townes O'Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of
Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359, 394-95 (1997) (citing JAMES S. COLEMAN &
THOMAS HOFFER, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS (1987); RAY MARSHALL & MARC
TUCKER, THINKING FOR A LIVING: EDUCATION AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1992);
SOUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION, REDEEMING THE AMERICAN PROMISE: REPORT
OF THE PANEL ON EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND POST-SECONDARY
DESEGREGATION (1995)).
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for educational success at a time when integration seems to be under
attack and the major focus among educators seems to be educational
reform. I believe this is a serious error whether one focuses on
education or democracy.
In this article I will attempt to show why integration must
continue to be a central focus for education and why the challenges to
integration in general and the challenges waged by the reform
movement in particular are misguided. I will examine and dissect the
differing perspectives surrounding education discourse and the
polarity that seems to be growing between the two major schools of
thought surrounding the issues - those perspectives being the
integrationist and reformist viewpoints.
In the second section I will attempt to contextualize school
reform by first examining the importance of the symbiotic
relationship that needs to exist between education and social justice.
Next, I will discuss the history of education jurisprudence to
demonstrate the ways in which citizenship and social justice for
African Americans have been marginalized in respect to educational
rights. And finally, I will look at how advocates have successfully
been turning to state statutes and constitutions that guarantee an
adequate education to students for relief. In the third section I will
examine choice as an ideological concept and discuss how choice-
based policies actually isolate low-income students of color4 from
educational opportunity and undermine the goals of reformists and
integrationists. In the last section entitled "integration" I will provide
a definition for educational integration and clarify the terminology
being used in discussion around this issue. I will elaborate on the
need for even desegregation and equality in our schools, while
suggesting that integration be a societal goal. In this section I will
also review the implications for a radically integrated society of
multiple school reform strategies. I will specifically look at separatist
schools, accountability, standardized testing, tracking, neighborhood
schools, educational choice programs, and charter schools. I will also
touch on reform strategies that cooperate with desegregation.
In education discourse there is a growing polarity between those
who might be called integrationists and those who might be called
reformists!s While the rhetorical tension between reformists and
4. Although this article focuses on African American students, the issues discussed
here also affect other students of color, including Latino, Native American. and Asian
American students.
5. The current trend is to move away from desegregation and view desegregation as
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integrationists seems to be sharply drawn, largely by the reformists,
the substantive divide is anything but clear. Although there is not
one single position taken by integrationists or reformists, there are
core tenets of each of these perspectives that will be helpful to
explore in examining the tension between these respective
educational camps.
6
I see integrationists and reformists as divided into two camps.
The first I will call the "modest integrationist." This person takes a
largely instrumental position, supporting racial integration primarily
to produce a set of educational outcomes for the learner. This
approach tends to be limited to education defined in a narrow sense
such as the development of reading, math, and other educational
skills. The goal of the modest integrationist is to achieve parity with
non-minority students within these limited educational categories.
These outcome-oriented goals tend also to be bound up with
input goals (i.e., insuring that minority students have the same
resources or inputs that non-minority students have). The modest
integrationist is focused on student outcomes, but at times the
position requires a call for greater inputs for minority students in
order to try to achieve the same set of outcomes had by non-minority
students. The modest integrationist advocates for integration for
largely instrumental reasons, believing that the political realities of
our society are such that it is impossible to access and maintain
resources for minority children short of integrated schooling. One
an oppositional measure to other school reforms. In 1999, school districts recently ending
or phasing out their desegregation plans included: Buffalo, New York; Broward County,
Florida; Mobile, Alabama; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Cleveland, Ohio; San Jose, California;
Seattle, Washington; Wilmington, Delaware; and Charlotte, North Carolina. At the same
time, school districts across the country are implementing school choice programs or
reverting to neighborhood-based schools: Clark County, surrounding Las Vegas, Nevada;
Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee; Duval County, Florida. See William L. Taylor &
Edwin Darden, Guidance to School Boards on Race and Student Assignment, INSIDE
SCHOOL LAW, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (Winter 1999).t
6. It is clear that one could be both in favor of integration and reform, and some
have called for both. Martha Minow has called for a building upon what she terms the last
wave of equity reforms, including school desegregation, rather than a shift to reform qua
reform. Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 259-260
(1999). But in the more polarized debate the claim for one is often framed in terms that
are exclusive of the other. For example, Clint Bolick advocates parental choice over
integration, arguing that with choice rather than race conscious policy, "we finally can
deliver on the sacred promise of equal educational opportunities for all of America's
school children." Clint Bolick, Solving the Education Crisis through Parental Choice, 11
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV, 245, 246 (2000) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)) (stating that education "is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms"). It is this tension that I will focus on in this paper.
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assumption made by modest integrationists is that those with
resources, primarily whites, will not abandon a school in which a
significant number of white students attend. This push for parity in
outcomes also helps to drive the move toward greater reliance on
standardized testing to measure the progress being made with respect
to these outcomes.
The second group of integrationists is what I will call the "radical
integrationists." They support educational parity but believe that
integration serves much broader educational values that transcend
narrow skills such as reading and math. Radical integrationists
believe that one of the principle goals of education is the creation of
an effective citizenry and the opening of a space for a truly multi-
racial, multi-ethnic society. This group believes that education has
both an instrumental and a non-instrumental purpose. They believe
that education, and particularly an integrated education, has intrinsic
value and is constitutive of who we are, individually and socially. To
this group, an effective segregated education is an oxymoronic
concept.
Before moving on to a discussion of reformists, it is important to
note that neither the modest nor the radical integrationist believes
that integration is largely about assimilation Assimilation, instead, is
about the erasing of racial or ethnic difference, usually in favor of a
dominant norm.' Some have argued that both racial segregation and
assimilation are predicated on the notion of white supremacy. Often
the misplaced attack on integration is really an attack on assimilation;
thus it is imperative to distinguish the two.
One goal of the many types of reformists is, like that of the
modest integrationist, to achieve educational parity. They believe
that this parity can be achieved by restructuring schools without
addressing the racial or economic consequences of segregated
schools. As a legal matter, reformists may accept the appropriateness
of Brown,9 but as an educational policy matter may believe that, at
7. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 636 (1992) (writing in
a critique of the scholarship of Professor Wechsler on Brown, "to surmise that what blacks
really sought in Brown was the right to associate with whites as opposed to the right not to
be excluded from schools ... exhibits a character of racial conceit that threatens to drown
all substance").
8. Daina C. Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty
Liberalism, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1053, 1125 n.152 (1994) (stating that "the salient features of
assimilation are that the members of ethnic groups.., adopt the characteristics of the
dominant culture and gain entry to its social institutions").
9. See generally, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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best, Brown is irrelevant and, at worst, harmful. While not supportive
of explicitly state-imposed segregation, reformists do not consider
segregation, in and of itself, to be an obstacle to achieving educational
goals. Rather, the emphasis is that efforts to integrate distract from
the business of reform.
Reforms espoused by this group can take the form of vouchers,
greater accountability through testing, charter schools, smaller class
size, and/or changing the curriculum. Virtually all reforms reject the
centrality of race and therefore racial integration in the schools. To
reformists, at least rhetorically, race does not matter. Some who
might be called modest reformists are willing to acknowledge that
class might matter, or more specifically, that high poverty schools can
create additional burdens for the learner. The more radical
reformists reject this claim and insist that neither race nor poverty
matter - only reform. In implementation, the reformists focus on the
school. Occasionally the focus will extend to the family, but rarely,
and not beyond the family to the structural forces that impact access
to educational opportunity.
The reformists' position of the irrelevance of race resonates well
with the current neo-conservative "colorblind" position. Drawing
attention to race, except in a very narrow set of circumstances, is
viewed as a distraction and even racist. Although not all reformists
accept all aspects of the neo-conservative doctrine, like their
conservative counterparts, they do reject the claim that a racially
segregated school carries any significance.10 In fact, some would
argue that it is racist to suggest that African American students need
to have white students in the classroom in order to learn." While this
position has some appeal, at least rhetorically, it misses the
underlying assumptions made by the radical and modest
integrationists. Even the reformists who reject the claim that race still
matters will often concede that economic segregation, or high poverty
in schools, may not be a good idea. There are some reformists who
argue that neither racial nor economic segregation carries significance
if the school is willing to adopt the right reform strategies.
In this article I will assess the dominant ideologies and practices
in education, and make both narrow practical claims as well as
10. For a discussion of the colorblind position see generally, Neil Gotunda, A Critique
of "Our Constitution in Color Blind," 44 STAN. L. RnV. 1 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(commenting that "[i]t never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume
that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior").
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broader normative claims. I attempt to root my critique of education
in legal history, data, and the exposure of privileging and
subordinating structures.
Why not abandon this exercise and demand that the entire
structure of education be toppled and constructed anew? After all,
the evidence is in: the systems in place disadvantage low-income
students of color, and open greater and greater opportunities to white
students. What could possibly be preserved? It is important to
recognize that advances toward educational parity have been made.
First, achievement gaps have narrowed considerably between
African Americans and whites." There is near equivalency between
whites and students of color in high school graduation rates,13 and
college attendance rates have risen dramatically for African
American students.4
Second, sifting through history and contemporary reality could
reveal to us structures that should survive. This is, in a manner, a
toppling - but one that is deliberative of the path we have taken, what
it has produced, and what we as a society should require of education.
A criticism I anticipate is that my call for a transformation of
education into one that has radical integration as its goal and reform
as its armature is idealistic and unrealizable. Even if this model of
education is unobtainable, I would respond, if it functions as a
regulative ideal and creates real improvements, it will have served the
transformative mission. 5 It may also provide a means of measuring
our progress beyond the narrow goal of parity.
H. Contextualizing School Reform
A. The Purpose of Education
The goal of public education is not only to provide all children
with a mastery of skills and knowledge, but to take them beyond that
to full participation in society. Second, it must be acknowledged that
12. O'Brien, supra note 3, at 396 (reporting that the gap has narrowed in terms of
reading, science, math, and SAT scores) (citing JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING
SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR 36-38 (1994)).
13. STEPHAN & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE
NATION INDIVISIBLE 190-91 (1997).
14. Id. at 192.
15. See generally RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND
RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983), for a discussion of how
values, as regulative ideals that may not be achievable, can guide and be transformative.
MIo. 28:
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public education is the primary mechanism for instilling our societal
values. According to the Agency for Education in Democracy,
schools are responsible for "[t]he enculturation of the young into the
freedoms and responsibilities of a democratic society." 6 Schools must
also provide a "deep and broad introduction into and preparation for
participation in the human conversation."'1
Education is a forum in which justice, and not merely choice, is
imperative. Neither equality in income, nor ability to pay for
education translates into equality of educational access, attainment,
or performance.Y Iris Young concurs, "Money continues to be a
major discriminator. Middle- and upper-class children have better
schools than poor or working-class children. Thus they are better
prepared to compete for college admission. If by chance poor and
working-class children qualify for college, they often cannot pay...
,19
Edmund Gordon has written that an effective education and
social justice, a too often disowned democratic ideal, are inextricably
linked:
There may be some educational context/process relationships
that are so symbiotic as to defy separation. It appears that
education and social justice are so symbiotically related. In
modem societies the achievement of universally effective
education may not be possible in the absence of contexts in
which social justice is valued and practiced. Similarly, the
achievement of social justice may not be possible in the absence
of achievement of universally effective education.
20
Since education is a highly important locus for personal
development, and effective education cannot occur without social
justice at the fore, we should ask what would result if justice were.
inserted into education. Can the ideas students have about race be
changed if education is just? The answer is clear from research on
school desegregation: students who are educated in an integrated
environment are more likely to live in integrated environments as
adults.2' This evidence shows that individual preferences are not pre-
16. John I. Goodlad, Education and Democracy: Advancing the Agenda, PHI DELTA
KAPPAN (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kgooOO09.htm.
17. Id.
18. See Emily Eakin, The Intellectual Class Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,2001, at A16-
A18 (describing the academic work of Pierre Bourdieu).
19. IRIS YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 207 (1990).t
20. EDMUND W. GORDON, EDUCATION & JUSTICE: A VIEW FROM THE BACK OF
THE BUS xii (1999).
21. Michal Kurlaender & John T. Yun, Is Diversity a Compelling Educational
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ordained; rather, that schools are a site of formation of the self and
the choices made later on in life. That this is true of the self, the site
of education, and perceptions on race has great significance for a new
model of education and justice.
Even if one accepts the notion that choice does not function in
the way that the rhetoric suggests, there may still be objection to
having the state intervene in an area called private choice. Certainly
under current Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, this would not
necessarily support a cognizable equal protection claim. The
arguments in favor of choice are not driven by Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, however. The proponents of choice are
often making normative arguments related to issues of fairness and
democracy, rather than legal arguments; but it is here that the claims
are weakest.
As far as constitutional claims regarding private choice, there is a
mistaken understanding of what is private. There is little
consideration about how choices are formed and the interaction
between government structures and private choice. This symbiotic
relationship is probably nowhere stronger than in the creation of race
and racialized choices.' Even if choices were private, there is an
argument that these choices reflect the badges and incidents of
slavery and should be analyzed under the Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
B. A History of Education Jurisprudence in the United States
To understand the ways in which the citizenship of African
Americans has been limited, particularly in the context of educational
rights, it is necessary to examine the history of the courts' engagement
with the issues of access to educational institutions, broadly defined,
and the negative impacts of the racially hierarchical nature of
education on African Americans, particularly low-income African
Americans.
This story is often told beginning with Brown, but it is more
appropriate to begin the story with Dred Scott. This is because,
although Brown" is often cited by the court for the overturning of
Interest? Evidence from Metropolitan Louisville, at
http://www.law.harvard.edulgroups/civilrights/publicationsllouisville.html (citing A.S.
Wells & R.L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School
Desegregation, REVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH, 64 (4): 531-555 (1994)).
22. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory
of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L. J. 1717 (2000).
23. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Plessy, this is too narrow a reading of Brown: it can also be read as
the overturning of Dred Scott. The Court in Dred Scott was explicit
that African Americans, slaves or otherwise, were not part of the
American polity. In the land of the free, even free African
Americans were unfree. There were no rights that whites were
required to respect for African Americans. They were subordinated
and subjugated. They were non-citizens. Plessy was a modification of
this same logic. Brown, however, embodied a pledge on the part of
the legal system to alter the systems that educate youth for citizenship
- toward a racially just set of systems - indeed, a pledge to grant full
citizenship to African Americans.
Though our schools today are the sites of greater equity than in
the era preceding Brown, schools in this nation have never been truly
integrated and are currently rapidly regressing to a state of racial and
economic segregation. Equity is not justice. The segregation
observed at present is a perpetuation of the denial of the right to the
constitution of the self, education and, more largely, democracy,
outside of a hierarchical and subordinating setting. When responding
to racial segregation, the courts have largely condoned assimilation or
striven for desegregation alone, rather than for a transformation of
the system of education that radical integrationism calls for.
The Pre-Brown Era of Jurisprudence
In the early history of the United States, African Americans and
other people of color were wholly denied citizenship. In Dred Scott
v. Sandford, Chief Justice Taney stated:
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were
imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a
member of the political community formed and brought into
existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such
become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities,
guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen?24
The Court held that black people were not citizens, and therefore had
no rights under the Constitution, stating that a slave "could form no
part of the design, no constituent ingredient or portion of a society
based upon common, that is, upon equal interests and powers. He
could not at the same time be the sovereign and the slave."'
Dred Scott was reconfigured in Plessy, but the position of the
Court that African Americans should be subjugated to whites
24. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,403 (1856).
25. Id. at 477.
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strongly remained: a renewed statement about the very limited
citizenship rights of people of color. Plessy v. Ferguson upheld the
segregation of African Americans in "separate but equal" settings.
2 6
Writing for the majority, Justice Brown reasoned:
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the
white and colored races - a distinction which is founded in the
color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as
white men are distinguished from the other race by color - has
no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-
establish a state of involuntary servitude.7
To support this rationale, and to uphold segregation against
challenges brought under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Court relied in part on a Massachusetts Supreme
Court decision upholding the segregation of public schools in
Boston.' In that case, the court opined that the Fourteenth
Amendment actually provided for separate but equal education
systems, stating:
[W]hen this great principle comes to be applied to the actual
and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant
the assertion that men and women are legally clothed with the
same civil and political powers, and that children and adults are
legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same
treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and
regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal
consideration and protection of the law for their maintenance
and security.29
This pronouncement of jurisprudential support for separate but
equal educational systems in Plessy caused civil rights advocates to
strategically alter their approach, by necessity of this legal framework
to a focus on institutional parity rather than racial justice in
education. From 1939 to 1954, civil rights activists focused their
challenges on the allegedly equal status of legally segregated African
American schools, calling for the enforcement of Plessy. One result
of this tactic, and a demonstration of the willingness of whites to fund
segregation, was that financing for African American schools in the
South increased 800 percent.0
26. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. Id. at 543.
28. Id. at 544 (citing Roberts v. *City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198, 1849 WL 2756 (Mass.)
(1849)).
29. Id.
30. MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCrION IN BLACK AMERICA 1945-1990 41 (1991).t
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C. Brown v. Board of Education and the Early Movement toward
Desegregation
The Brown cases, discussed in this section, exhibited a reversal in
the approach of civil rights advocates, who targeted their efforts
toward undermining the rationale behind keeping schools separate,
having won for a time the battle over equality in funding
In the landmark 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of Education,3
the Supreme Court ruled that separate educational facilities did
indeed provide unequal opportunities, finding against proponents of
separate but equal schools. In overruling Plessy,32 the Court in Brown
acknowledged that the psychological stigma of segregation deprived
African American students of an equal education, stating that
segregated schools are "inherently unequal."33 Brown can be seen as
the first promise of full citizenship to African Americans. With a
truly equal and integrated education, African American students
would take a substantial step toward full and equal participation in
American society. Moreover, students of all races, and our society
itself, would benefit from a more fully realized democracy.
That this promise would not be kept, in any way truly
transformative of education and other democratic structures, was
apparent very early on. Education administrators, politicians, and the
judiciary refused to accept the full meaning of the case and generally
read Brown in its most narrow construction: as a command to make
only slight reparations for the exclusion of African Americans from
the very structure that would permit participation of African
Americans in the shaping and construction of American society. In
1955, one year after their original decision in Brown, the Court in
Brown v. Board of Education (No. II), placed the implementation of
the Brown I ruling in the hands of district courts, merely mandating
that desegregation be done "with all deliberate speed."'  The
Supreme Court subsequently refused to hear desegregation cases for
eight years.3'
31. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
34. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (II), 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955).
35. Positive federal legislation was enacted to contend with school segregation in
1964. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act authorized the federal Department of Justice and
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to take action on school
desegregation. The effect was observable with, between 1964 and 1966, the percentage of
Southern black children attending desegregated schools rising by almost 10 percent, from
2.3 percent to 12 percent. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 601-606, as amended, 42
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
During the 1960s the Supreme Court critically examined
undertakings toward fulfillment of the Brown promise of inclusive
citizenship, giving particular scrutiny to the choice programs that had
become pervasive in the post-Brown period: a presaging of the
current tumult. In 1964, in Griffin v. County School Board, the Court
determined that the deliberate speed mandate had proven
ineffective." In response to the protracted delays in Southern school
desegregation, the Court stated that "[t]he time for mere deliberate
speed has run out."'37 Standing firmly behind the principle in Griffin,
the Court, in the 1968 case Green v. County School Board of New
Kent County, disapproved what had become a favorite tool of
desegregation avoidance in the South: "freedom-of-choice"
programs. 9 These programs involved simply opening the doors of
formerly egregated schools, though in reality not even the doors
were opened, as discussed later in this article, because the actions of
administrators, parents, and others at predominantly white schools
prevented African American students from "choosing" the same
schools that whites chose, thereby reifying the racially hierarchical
state of public education.
The ostensible "open door" solution fails to meet nearly every
criterion for a racially just educational system as espoused by the
radical integrationist. Instead of creating a space in which students
can self-constitute and give shape to education, the schools, by
drawing African American students into a setting inscribed by white
supremacy, would have created a program for assimilation.
Additionally, this would have retained the white students in a
supremacist structure. Were, instead, the schools and all families, in a
participatory manner, to have examined the goals of education, the
setting in which learning occurs, the tools of education, and the social
and economic context of the students, and sought a transformation
responsive to the need for racial justice, the radical integrationist
would have found reason to support the effort.
Instead of permitting choice programs to foil efforts at
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000d to 2000d- 4a (providing that "no person in the United States shall, on
the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance."). See J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO
BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979).
36. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
37. Id. at 234.
38. Id. at 218.
39. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
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desegregating the schools, the Court in Green mandated that schools
"convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch."' 4
The 1970's saw a conservative turn in the Supreme Court's
school segregation cases, simultaneous with the Nixon administration
diminishing the strength of the federal government's desegregation
efforts.4' Exemplifying this turn was the 1973 case Keyes v. School
District Number 1.42 There, the Court held that in school districts
where no law mandated segregated schools, illegal de jure43
discrimination could still be found if district policies and practices
were intended to segregate the schools. By broadly interpreting "de
jure" segregation to include intentionally segregative policies, rather
than just explicitly segregationist laws, the Court in Keyes extended
the duty to desegregate to many northern cities.' But in so doing, the
Court forsook the opportunity to abolish altogether the distinction
between de jure and de facto, or "in fact," discrimination.45 This more
progressive move, advocated by only two justices filing separate
opinions in Keyes, would have imposed on all segregated school
districts the obligation to desegregate.46
40. Id. at 438.
41. During the mid-1960s the Court had made desegregation a priority. By 1969, the
new Nixon administration began to diminish the strength of desegregation efforts on the
part of the federal government. In the summer of 1969, the Nixon administration
announced that it would leave enforcement of desegregation orders to the courts, and
would no longer avail itself of the power to enforce desegregation, by cutting off federal
funding under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This was a statement on the part of the
administration that racially just participation in democratic structures would not be a
priority, and this spurred major setbacks to the causes of both the modest and radical
integrationists. Shifts in the judiciary began to spell disaster as well, due in large part to
Nixon appointments to the Court. In his first term as President, Nixon had the
opportunity to appoint four justices to the nine-member Supreme Court. Nixon's first two
appointees, Warren Burger in 1969 and Harry Blackmun in 1970, initially appeared willing
to acquiesce in the Court's pro-desegregation opinions. But the resignation in 1971 of
Justices Black and Harlan, and their replacement with conservative Justices Powell and
Rehnquist, marked a devastating turn in desegregation jurisprudence. See A. JAMES
REICHLEY, CONSERVATIVES IN AN AGE OF CHANGE: THE NIXON AND FORD
ADMINISTRATIONS (1981).
42. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. (1), 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
43. See id- at 201.
44. See id. at 208.
45. See id.
46. It is significant that almost immediately after the Keyes decision, Colorado ended
Denver's liberal annexation powers. An amendment to the state constitution foreclosed
any annexation after 1975 - just 2 years after Keyes. See Colo. Const. art. XIV § 3 (the
"Poundstone Amendment"). This illustrates how closely tied housing segregation and the
fragmentation of jurisdictions within a metropolitan region are to school segregation.
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The failure of the Keyes Court to set the stage for confrontation
of de facto segregation has profound relevance to the larger
discussion of this article. This case disturbingly confirmed that whites
were unwilling to accept and examine education as a forum for a
racially just democracy, but were only willing to support reparations
for explicit, clinically evidenced white supremacy, and only then in a
narrowly distributive fashion. This was a lost opportunity for a
declaration that systemic racism requires systemic and far-reaching
transformation.
In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, also decided in
1973, the Court ruled that there is no federal constitutional right to an
education and that the disparate distribution of school funding in
Texas did not violate the Constitution.47 This was another blow to
efforts to advance racial and economic justice in education, and
served as a tool for maintaining the isolation of racially and
economically marginalized students.
The import of the de jure/de facto distinction set out in Keyes was
demonstrated the following year when the Supreme Court, in a five-
to-four decision in Milliken v. Bradley,' struck down the district
court's order requiring interdistrict desegregation of Detroit and fifty-
three surrounding suburbs. The Court ruled that cross-district
desegregation measures could not be ordered unless it was shown that
intentionally racially discriminatory acts of either the state or local
officials were a substantial cause of the interdistrict segregation.49
While this decision did not completely rule out metropolitan-area-
wide desegregation efforts, it set a standard of proof that has since
been met only twice, both times in metropolitan areas with only a few
suburban school districts.'
In 1991, in Oklahoma City School Board v. Dowell, the Court
ruled that as soon as a school district achieves unitary status it may be
released from its court-ordered desegregation measure, and there is
no redress for any resultant de facto segregation.51 Here again the de
jure/de facto distinction adopted in Keyes is important. Even though
the end of busing after the Dowell decision led to a quick
resegregation of elementary schools in Oklahoma City, there will be
47. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
48. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
49. Id. at 744-45.
50. See Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977); Cunningham v. Grayson, 541
F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1976).
51. Oklahoma Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 236 (1991).
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no remedy for this segregation. Under Keyes, this resegregation,
caused not by intentionally discriminatory policies but by a reversion
to neighborhood schools, would likely be considered de facto, and
therefore constitutionally acceptable.
Finally, in the 1992 case of Freeman v. Pitts, the Court no longer
required a district to have all portions of its desegregation plan
complete before releasing it from supervision."
D. Promising Jurisprudence
With the regressive shifts occurring in the federal jurisprudence,
advocates have turned for relief to state statutes and constitutions
that guarantee an adequate education to students. Adequacy suits
not only reject the narrow federal jurisprudence but also breathe new
life into Dewey's concept that education is about citizenship. In Sheff
v. O'Neilf3 and a number of other cases, suburban whites have been
members of the plaintiff class: if education is constitutive, then a
segregated education not only marks minority urban students but
white suburban students as well. As Toni Morrison has noted, we
have acknowledged how our racist structures and histories have
marked African Americans but little attention has been paid to how
these phenomena have marked whites. ' Adequacy suits provide a
space for this.
Several cases outside of the adequacy sphere in the past few
decades are remarkable in that the courts showed a cognizance of the
link between racial isolation in education and patterns of residential
segregation, or because the scope of the remedy ordered by the court
demonstrated an understanding that only a metropolitan-wide
desegregation scheme would effectively begin to address the problem.
A resurgence in this type of judicial analysis and remedy-crafting is
necessary to prevent further resegregation of the schools, and to open
the door to more effective integration-oriented school reforms. That
is, a satisfaction of the aspirations of reformists and integrationists.
Successful desegregation for decades was achieved in Charlotte,
through the embrace of such broadly reaching remedies. In Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, after finding that segregated residential
patterns in the city and county resulted from federal, state, and local
government action, a unanimous Court authorized district courts to
employ a variety of remedial tools as they oversaw the desegregation
52. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992).
53. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267,1271 n.3 (Conn. 1996).
54. See TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK (1992).t
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process, including: the adoption of express racial goals for the student
population in each desegregating school, as well as for faculty and
staff racial ratios; the "pairing" of neighborhoods within a school
district to meet desegregation goals; and busing." This first busing
program in the nation caused Charlotte to become one of the most
thoroughly desegregrated school systems. 6
In the companion case, North Carolina State Board of Education
v. Swann, the Court unanimously struck down North Carolina's anti-
busing law, which had forbidden any assignment of school children by
race. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger described race-
conscious student assignments as an essential tool to fulfill "the
promise of Brown" and rebuffed North Carolina's contention that the
federal Constitution required "colorblind" student assignments.
Another important case is Liddell v. City of St. Louis, 5' because
the court considered the effect of patterns of residential segregation
on school segregation, and recommended a remedy that addressed
the relationship between the two. The court wrote that governmental
actions had "intensified racial segregation""6 and, accordingly: "It is
critical that future actions in the housing area of all governmental
bodies, federal, state and local, facilitate and not hamper school
desegregation."'"
The vast majority of cases do not evince an understanding of the
ways in which political fragmentation creates segregation and
undermines democracy.62 Sheff again, is an exception. In Sheff, the
Connecticut Supreme Court held that the state constitution
guaranteed the right to a substantially equal educational opportunity
55. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
56. See Davison M. Douglas, The Quest for Freedom in the Post-Brown South:
Desegregation and White Self-Interest, 70 CHi-KENT L. REV. 689, 694 (1994).
57. North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
58. Id. at 45. However, the desegregation mandate that resulted from Swam was
largely undone by the court in the 1999 Capachione case. The court found that the school
district had met the goals of the desegregation mandate and could be declared unitary.
Neighborhood-based student assignment is planned for the 2001-2002 school year. The
district court enjoined the Charlotte-Mecklenburg board from using racial criteria in
making student assignments, even if the school board believes such a course is necessary
and desirable to promote racially and ethnically heterogeneous public schools.
59. Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
60. Id. at 358.
61. Id.
62. For a good discussion and empirical showing of the relationship between political
fragmentation and school segregation, see DAVID RuSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBuRBs 35-
38 (1993).
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and that the de facto segregation in the public schools in Hartford
deprived students of this opportunity.6 Crucial to the judgment was
the fact that municipal and school district lines were identical by
statute. This districting statute was called the single greatest
contributor to segregation in the opinion. At the time of the suit, the
districting statute had left fourteen of Hartford's twenty-five
elementary schools with a white enrollment of less than two percent.
By considering the fragmented design of the metropolitan region, the
court in Sheff was able to ascertain the engine behind the segregation
and design the appropriate remedy.64
These cases are exceptions to a generally very limiting
jurisprudence.
1I. Confronting Choice
In this section of the article, I examine choice as an ideological
construct. As such a construct, in the current discourse on urban
education and low-income students of color, I will assert, it is a
vehicle for the isolation of low-income students of color, and
undermines the goals of reformists and integrationists. It may be
tempting to simply disarm choice. After all, choice is merely decision
making.' Considered only as such, it could be the banner waved by
conservatives or progressives. Who would object to a framework for
participation in democratic structures? But it is not useful to simply
dismiss or embrace choice. Instead, I will interrogate the way we use
and think about choice in a given reality. The problem then that I am
confronting is not choice in an abstract sense but the particular way
that choice is used in a particular context. I will attempt to
problematize and demystify choice not in a general sense but in the
way it is used in our current discussion of integration and reform.
Choice appropriately understood and contextualized has a certain but
only limited value in our societal pursuit of a racially just and viable
63. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
64. Note that the court directed the legislature to take appropriate actions to remedy
this. The legislature responded with An Act Enhancing Educational Choices and
Opportunities of 1997, establishing an array of interdistrict programs and voluntary
student transfers in Hartford and its suburbs. The State Department of Education was
charged with creating a five year plan to reduce fiscal disparities and racial isolation in the
schools, and has implemented several components to date, the efficacy of programs which
is hotly contested.
65. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword Positive Political Theory in
the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 461 (1992) (finding that scholarship on public choice is
"prone to focus on abstract features of political decisionmaking").
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democracy.
Choice is presently constructed in this society as an unfettered
good. As such, we implicitly assume that the more choice the better,
and that a world with unlimited choice would be ideal. Choice is also
seen as an individual act based largely on personal preference
unmediated through social space and institutions. Therefore,
autonomy is closely associated with choice. This view of choice would
also make discussion of other values such as justice and equality
unnecessary. That is, whatever is produced by choice is necessarily
good. This view of choice is used in our society as a justification for
continued racial subjugation and to obscure the way in which
structure and systems reproduce racial inequality in our schools and
larger society.' As long as the present arrangements are a production
of these private choices, they are fair. But this notion of choice
advances neither justice nor democracy in the larger context, nor
parity in the more narrow context. At a more abstract level, a notion
of choice that is not mediated through social practices and structures
and that is unlimited is simply incoherent. Such a concept of choice is
therefore not only not desirable, it is not possible.
Most reformists adopt this rhetoric of choice, which suffers from
a number of flaws. One flaw operates at a conceptual abstract level.
As asserted above, the choice advanced by many of its popular
supporters simply does not and cannot exist. The second flaw follows
the first. Because choice and the preferences it is related to are seen
as natural, there is an inadequate examination as to how choice and
related preferences come into being. Examination of this flaw has
been developed by some of the critics of public choice theory but
remains outside of the popular reformist discourse on choice. The
failure to understand the relational nature of choice and how it is
exercised in a social context is a flaw. This last error will be examined
more closely below especially in the context of racial hierarchy and
educational structures.
Choice is offered in our society as having both intrinsic and
instrumental value. The assumption is that the more choice one has,
the more free and good our society will become. This value is seen as
attached to the individual and reflecting natural preference. But as
we look at choice, it becomes clear that choice in a social
environment such as education is often about a set of relationships
and power that must be justified by other norms. The failure to
66. For a discussion of this matter, see Deval Patrick, Forum: In Pursuit of a Dream
Deferred: Linking Housing and Education, 80 MINN. L. REv. 743 (1996).
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contend with this will not only undermine many of our important
democratic norms, but also will obscure the fact that unfettered
choice will eventually turn and consume itself.
Choice has a particularly suspect history in the school context.
Choice was used after Brown as many southern school systems tried
to avoid the reaches of Brown, maintaining the subjugation of
African Americans under various choice schemes.67 Certain federal
courts responded, demonstrating a clarity that is often lacking in
today's discourse of choice, by not permitting choice to excuse
continued racial subjugation. As federal district court Judge Wisdom
wrote, "[e]ach of these laws, whether its objective was obvious or
nonobvious, was designed to provide a state-supported sanctuary for
white children in flight from desegregated public schools.""
At that time, the Supreme Court similarly insisted on looking at
both the impact on desegregation of the plans offered by the various
school systems69 and the relational nature of the choice to be
exercised. The Court required an analysis of the relative choices
available to African American and white children historically and
contemporaneously.70 The Court noted that while choice exists
formally, it might nonetheless not exist in fact:7'
'Freedom of choice' is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means
to a constitutionally required end - the abolition of the system
of segregation and its effects. If the means prove effective, it is
acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other means must
be used to achieve this end. The school officials have the
continuing duty to take whatever action necessary to create a
'unitary, nonracial system.'7
The racialization of choice caused the Court to reject choice
plans adopted by southern school districts after Brown.' The choice
67. For a description of these maneuvers, see O'Brien, supra note 3, at 355-91.
68. O'Brien, supra note 3, at 386-87. (citing Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance
Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833,834 (E.D. La. 1967)).
69. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
(rejecting a "freedom of choice" plan where the effect was the perpetuation of racial
segregation).
70. Id. at 432-33, 435 (analyzing the history and pervasiveness of segregation in the
district as well as the impact of the choice plan on school demographics).
71. Id. at 434 n.2 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 181.54 (1967) that, according to Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare regulations, "'freedom-of-choice' plans are among those
considered acceptable [in the desegregation process] so long as in operation such a plan
proves effective [in desegregating schools]") (Brennan, J.).
72. Id. at 440 (quoting the concurring opinion in Bowman v. County Sch. Bd. of
Charles City County, 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967)).
73. See, e.g., Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs of the City of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450, 457
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
plans offered today suffer from similar limitations. Today, however,
with few exceptions, there is scant meaningful examination of school
choice in relationship to issues of racial justice.
Dorothy Roberts is one of the few scholars to challenge the rush
to supplant justice with choice. She describes the hierarchical
relationship between liberalism and justice as the "priority
paradigm,"74 asserting in particular that the hierarchy protects
personal liberty at the expense of justice:
The priority paradigm.., rests on the inherent assumption of
liberal philosophy that privileging individual autonomy over
social justice is essential to human freedom. The primacy of
liberty, which shifts the burden of persuasion to those seeking
to limit individual choice, does not allow for the possibility that
other concerns might have equal constitutional or moral
importance. Liberals require the state to remain neutral as to
competing conceptions of value and human relationships so that
each individual is free to choose her own moral understanding
of justice. While government neutrality protects citizens against
imposition of state orthodoxy, it also means the definition of
liberty must set aside certain claims to substantive equality. 7
Roberts argues that the priority paradigm successfully cloaks the
fact that individual preferences and decisions are not autonomous,
but are made within and tied to power structures:
The priority paradigm rests on the belief that individuals'
choices are purely personal, in the sense that they reflect only
individual desires, fulfill the individual's unique meaning of self,
and benefit the individual alone. This view, however, masks
how whites' personal choices often are connected to oppressive
social structures and constitute an exercise of power. Thus,
liberalism's professed commitment to personal liberty turns out
to safeguard massive institutional inequality.76
(1968) (rejecting choice plan that failed to alter demographics in Tennessee school
district); Raney v. Bd. of Educ. of the Gould Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 443, 446 (1968) (holding
similarly in an Arkansas school district).
74. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the Limits of
Equality, 57 U. PITr. L. REV. 363, 366 (1996).
75. Id. at 370 (citing Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice, Procreative Liberty, and the
Limits of Liberal Theory: Robertson's Children of Choice, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1005
(1995); John A. Robertson, The Rightness of Rights Analysis: A Response to Dorothy
Roberts, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1022 (1995); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALI-SM AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REv. 521 (1989)).
76. Id. at 374-75 (citing, for a critique of the liberal concept of the individual,
MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Michael Sandel,
Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV.
521 (1989); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988)).
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Further, the preferences enabled by a choice framework are not
those of a fixed, monolithic individual-this individual does not exist,
nor do preferences truly exist outside of a social and political frame.'
"The possibility that private preferences ought, at least in some
circumstances, not to be regarded as autonomous thus has powerful
implications ...."'
This is also true to an extent for whites. That is, all of our
choices, including those of whites, are necessarily constrained. This
constraint is a function of our individuality and social being. Limited
choices or constraints are a function of the nature of our physical and
mental world. The nature of the world constrains and constitutes us.
To be physical and mental beings in a real sense is difficult if not
impossible to imagine without constraints. So the challenge to
constraints or limited choice must be particular, of a particular nature,
and not counter to constraints generally. In addition to this more
global challenge, we are also limited in our choices because of our
relationship to each other and because of scarcity.
If one person chooses something of a limited nature, then others'
choices are immediately constrained. Similarly, if one person chooses
something of a relational nature, then others are constrained. Thus it
is not that whites live in a world with unlimited choices while African
Americans and other minorities live in a world without choice.
Rather, the choices that each group makes are limited in a
hierarchical and racialized way.
Whites use their power to prioritize their choices as white in a
hierarchical relationship to people of color. Institutions and practices
such as the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries are used to reflect
this power. Part of the power of white preference is to cast this
racialized arrangement as neutral and invisible. To challenge this
practice would be to challenge the norm, or the status quo, and so
preferences are unquestioned and privileged. 9  Institutions and
77. What implication does this further suggest in reference to the social and political
frame of the United States when whites attain power by exercising their preferences, but
people of color do not? I am not talking about individual whites but whites collectively.
Whites are preserving their accumulated material status and political power by
participating in these structures, while African Americans do not have access to the
structures that have benefited and continue to privilege whites, such as wealth structures
and the political process.
78. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHi. L. REV.
1129,1137-38 (1986).
79. Roberts, supra note 76, at 381 (citing Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay
on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813 (1992); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent,
Anti-Discrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J.
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practices in society are designed to be responsive to white preference
and to frustrate African American preference.' This invisibility
allows preferences to persist and be fortified, not simply in their being
exercised by whites, but also because it is difficult for those seeking
justice to mount an attack against an invisible enemy." These
arrangements are not simply the reflections of white power and
choices but also produce white choices and power.
Even if the racialized nature of structures were made visible and
individuals making choices were equipped today with equal material
and political capital, the choices of African Americans would
continue to be more constrained by whites' choices. This is because
there is a "logic" to the institutions that serve whites and disserve
African Americans and other minorities - a logic that extends beyond
capital resources.' This is the basis of a call for transformation of the
institutions and structures rather than a demand for distributive or
instrumental justice.
But what are white choices? Because choices are relational,
white choices are as much about non-whites as about whites. When
whites decide to leave a school system, they often attempt to make
the choice not just about leaving a particular system, but distancing
themselves from African Americans. To effectuate such a choice,
black choice must be constrained in relationship to white choice.'
Whites may refuse to attend formerly black schools because
their community's history of school segregation has led them to
expect that a "white" school is their proper place. Even though
blacks retain the opportunity to attend a white school and
1329 (1991)).
80. Bell, supra note 7, at 898-99 (noting that institutions do not positively respond to
black interest if it is in conflict with white interest) (referring to work by Professor
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Lail. A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-53 (1978)).
81. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 1166 (describing the complexities of choice when
knowledge is absent).
82. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1850 (1994) (describing how the logic of geographic
segregation will continue to harm blacks even if income parity with whites is achieved).
On the logic of institutions, see generally, Lopez supra, note 23 at 1717. See generally,
DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED (1999) for a good discussion of
how wealth rather than education or occupation reproduces racial inequality. It is
important to note that because of the group nature of segregation, the disadvantage to
blacks and the advantage to whites does not occur primarily at the individual level. For a
discussion of the racialized state of high poverty schools, see Gary Orfield & John T. Yun,
Resegregation in American Schools, A Report of the Civil Rights Project, (1999) available at
http://www.law.harvard.edulcivilrights/publications/resegregation99.html.
83. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1988) (theorizing on choice and constraint).
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receive a less segregated education, as long as whites refuse to
attend previously black schools, the black schools will remain
all black, and black children will be able to secure a less
segregated education only by choosing to change schools and
being unequally burdened .. .
Nancy Denton has argued that self-segregation is not free choice,
that it is more often a retreat from a society that demonstrates
hostility to African Americans through discrimination.
'Voluntary' implies a free choice between at least two options,
without compulsion or obligation; it connotes a positive choice.
Thus, the issue is not whether some blacks prefer to live in all-
or mainly-black neighborhoods... Rather, the issue is really
whether such a 'choice' can be called voluntary if it results from
a need to escape racism and racists.5
I would question whether there is ever such a thing as free choice
to be exercised by anyone. This phrase suggests a misunderstanding
of the nature of choice or a different understanding of true choice. It
may be that the problem with the choice made available to whites and
African Americans in the housing context described by Professor
Denton is that there is a relational nature to the choice given African
Americans and whites, and the choices are hierarchically ordered.
What I have argued thus far is not an attack on choice. Rather, it
is an attempt to release choice from an unworkable, idealistic
liberalism. In order to make choice workable, we must have a better
understanding of what choice means and how and why it necessarily
constrains even as it grants one some degree of autonomy. 6 It is also
necessary to contextualize choice: by placing the construct within an
understanding of its past and persistent harms to people of color,
particularly those economically as well as racially marginalized. "If..
. preferences of these various sorts were changed through a collective
process of discovering and countering the distortions that underlie
them, it would be proper to say that freedom was promoted rather
than undermined as a result."87
This contextualization should not be limited to education, but
should envelop the full web of opportunity-granting and -denying
84. Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 728,745-46 (1986).
85. Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential
Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795, 808 (1996).
86. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 223-30 (1993) (contending with choice,
autonomy, constraints on choice, and structural dynamics).
87. Sunstein, supra note 77, at 1136 (citing, generally, RICHARD B. BRANDT, A
THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1983)).
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structures, such as residence. Nancy Denton exhorts this
contextualization in a critique of the separatist position:
Comparing all-white to all-black neighborhoods to justify why
segregation might be good thus ignores the social context in
which segregated neighborhoods were created and persist. The
comparison would only be valid in a society with equitable
power distribution across the races and no racism - hardly a
description of contemporary United States society. This is not
to say that all-black neighborhoods are intrinsically bad, but
rather to point out that all-black neighborhoods, because of the
social context of the white power structure in which they are
embedded, face a harder time in gaining equitable resource
allocation than all-white ones. Those who assert that all-black
neighborhoods are justifiable can make logical and even
compelling points. However, the separatist position - like the
argument that segregation is due to individual choice - ignores
the practical and historical facts of racism, power, and economic
domination.8
If the public dialogue around choice were to shift toward such an
exposure of privileging and subordinating structures, gains could
likely be made. Amartya Sen has written, "particular importance has
to be attached to the role of public discussion and interactions in the
emergence of shared values and commitments."' If public discussion
is reformed, it follows that decisions made by individuals within a
choice setting will be formed by that public discussion. It is
conceivable, then, that the result would be more equitable decision
making, even if, as Sen cautions, "we tend to react to one another's
views sometimes with a compromise or even a deal," because "a
workable solution can be based on the contingent acceptance of
particular provisions, without demanding complete social
unanimity."'
Salvaging choice requires going beyond a reparations or
distributive approach and to the adoption of a model of choice that
maximizes the ability of subordinated groups to fully participate in
society in a constitutive and distributive manner.91 This would likely
transform the institutions as well as the things to be chosen and those
88. Denton, supra note 87, at 810.
89. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 253 (1999).
90. Id.
91. john a. powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, in
THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND
PORNOGRAPHY 340-41 (Laura Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995) (arguing that the
most important right is that of participation); see also YOUNG, supra note 20 at 91-95
(discussing participatory and distributive reforms to democratic structures).
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making the choice.
Roberts suggests that liberty should be preserved because it is an
important principle in promoting racial equality. She calls for a
reconstruction of the notions of liberty and equality: "A critical
aspect of this vision is an understanding of liberty and equality that
accounts for group oppression. Once we understand liberty as
requiring the eradication of oppressive structures rather than
opposing these changes, it makes no sense to prioritize liberty over
equality. ))9
What form could policies attendant to reconstructed notions of
choice, preference, the non-autonomous individual, and power take
in education? Systemic reform is needed in the place of
individualized reform, and must safeguard against white supremacy
rather than reflect it by forcing a choice of segregation or
assimilation:
Because of the nature of the past discrimination, effective
remedies for individuals cannot be furnished by purely
individualistic solutions such as letting students choose their
schools one-by-one; individualistic solutions misunderstand the
remedial right. A black child's remedial right is not a right to
attend the previously white school; it is a right to attend a
desegregated school - an institution that is not racially
identified, an institution whose attendance patterns do not
reflect the regime of past de jure segregation, an institution that
is not an element of a segregated system. That individual right
simply cannot be fully achieved in isolation from what happens
to other children: the effectuation of individual rights requires
coordinated systemic action.93
Even if racialized choice could be removed from this choice
model, which is highly doubtful, there are still reasons to believe that
such a model would not be consistent with fairness and democracy.
The way that we discuss choice assumes educational resources are
commodities.
As a commodity, education can be bought; this is manifested in
the choice paradigm in which the highest bidder (i.e., the parent with
the greatest resources to investigate and select a school for the
student) gets the best school and others (i.e., the parent lacking the
time, or other social capital, other resources, and education) are left
with the "choice" of a struggling school.
92. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the Limits of
Equality, 57 U. PrT. L. REv. 363,403-04 (1996).
93. Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86
COLuM. L. REv. 728,751 (1986).
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The notion of education as a commodity is also reflected in
distribution-based reforms. Because ascribing the character and
mechanisms of a commodity to education ultimately fails low-income
students in general, and low-income students of color in particular,
while keeping white students in the machinery of supremacy, this
framework is unsuitable and unjust. The choice model employed in
today's discourse makes a mockery of equal opportunity and
undermines the human capacity of millions of American children. It
is imperative to replace this framework with one in which education is
understood to be a social good rather than a private commodity, as
well as a site of constitution of the self,94 and a vehicle for racial and
economic integration.
We must reject a model of choice advocated by many reformists
that mischaracterizes choice as unfettered, that conceives of choice
being exercised by the individual, and that envisions only distributive
goals for participants. A new model of choice would view education
as a public good. It would be constructed around choice as a matter
not just in the abstract, but in reality and as relational. Specifically, a
new model would conceive of choice in terms of ability to participate,
not only in terms of social resources but also in terms of the
constitution of our society and ourselves. If all families are provided
a list of schools that they can send their children to, but only half of
those families in fact have the capability of accessing those schools,
the model is unjust. However, if the model contemplates capability to
exercise choice, it will move us closer to a just result.95 But even this
approach still ignores the constitutive role of collective participation.
If parents and students were allowed to meaningfully participate in
the creation of school and educational goals and practices, they would
have a different set of choices than the ones presently available to
them. Since the capability to exercise choice is racialized, the model
should deliberately and explicitly contend with race. This would be
the first step on the path advocated by the group I have referred to
here as radical integrationists.
94. See supra text accompanying section II. A., The Purpose of Education (describing
education as an important locus of personal development, racial and cultural identity and
attitudes, and internalization of societal values).
95. See generally, SEN, supra note 91.
[Vol. 28:
Spring 2001]TENSIONS BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND SCHOOL REFORM 681
IV. Integration
A. Integration and Even Desegregation
Before turning to the continuing need for educational integration
and integration-cooperative reforms, it is important to clarify
terminology. Segregation is racial, ethnic, and/or socioeconomic
homogeneity of schools. Desegregation has come to mean numeric
balance of racial and ethnic groups within a school - as it was
originally intended, it was a broader term that encompassed elements
of what I will now call integration. In the words of Martin Luther
King, Jr.:
Although the terms desegregation and integration are often
used interchangeably, there is a great deal of difference
between the two. In the context of what our national
community needs, desegregation alone is empty and shallow.
We must always be aware of the fact that our ultimate goal is
integration, and that desegregation is only a first step on the
road to the good society 
....
Educational integration is the systemic transformation of a
school to create a diverse and inclusive environment within the school
and the curricula, achieved through a variety of reforms.
Importantly, integration is not simply a goal in terms of the schools in
which students learn as a static site, but requires a transformation of
the setting in which the identities of students are formed and form
others. This is a deeper sense of integration. Edmund Gordon has
written that we all operate on multiple cognitive levels, and require
plurality in our thinking in order to reach full participation in society
- this is the idea of integration of the mind:
[This] refers to the increasing demand that learners develop
multiple competencies, some of which ... apply generally while
others will [apply in more] idiosyncratic settings. All of us find
ourselves increasingly in situations where we must meet other
than indigenous standards. Thus it is required that we become
multilingual, multicultural, multiskilled, and capable of
functioning in multiple environments and settings. So, while
education is influenced by and must be responsive to the
differences with which learners enter the educational system,
the exit characteristics of its students must reflect the pluralistic
demands of the society in which they live.97
96. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE ETHICAL DEMANDS FOR INTEGRATION
(1962).t
97. GORDON, supra note 21, at 49.
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Integration is sometimes confused with assimilation, which forces
a conformity to dominate white culture upon minority students. The
integration that others in the radical integrationist camp and I are
calling for requires a transformation of these privileging and
subordinating structures and should not produce assimilation.
The Need for Even Desegregation Continues
A new model for justice and education requires a rejection of a
distributive approach. But it is meaningful that we as a society have
not even achieved distributional equality in the schools. That is,
neither the calls made by the most modest integrationists nor
reformists have been answered. Pertinent data on this failure are
offered in this section. Students of color historically have suffered
lower academic achievement and depressed life opportunities as
compared to white students when they are educated in segregated
environments. This conclusion was central to the Brown decision,
and remains true today: children in racially isolated, high-poverty
urban schools face myriad challenges that middle-class suburban
children do not face, including substandard or deteriorating facilities,
larger demands made on fewer resources which forces the cutting of
so-called non-basic opportunities, racial isolation, concentration of
poverty, and fewer familial resources.98
A profound contributing factor to school segregation and racial
and economic inequities generally is housing segregation, but we have
not effectively addressed this connection as a society. Housing and
school segregation are inextricably linked; the largest central city
schools serve an increasingly non-white and poor population,
reflecting the housing segregation in these cities. Cities like New
York, Los Angeles, and Chicago have schools that have at least 85%
students of color. Cities like Detroit and Washington, D.C. serve
virtually no white students.'
As a result of our failure to acknowledge the forces driving
school segregation, and the implications for educational opportunity
of school segregation, public schools are resegregating. Between 1980
and 1997, the number of African American students who attended
majority white schools declined from 37.1 percent to 31.2 percent. In
98. Emeral A. Crosby, Urban Schools: Forced to Fail, PHI DELTA IKAPPAN, (Dec.
1999), available at http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kcro9912.htm. See also Institute on
Race and Poverty, Student Voices Across the Spectrum: The Educational Integration
Initiatives Project (May 2000) (copy on file with the author).
99. Orfield & Yun, supra note 84.
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the South, after showing improvement for over 20 years, the number
of African American students attending majority white schools began
declining rapidly from 43.5 percent to 36.6 percent between 1988 and
1994. The number of Latino students attending majority white school
declined from 45.2 percent to 25.2 percent between 1968 and 1997."o
Concentrated poverty that arises along with residential
segregation brings with it additional impediments. Schools with high
levels of low-income and minority students suffer more intensely the
inadequacies many school reforms purport to address, such as
parental involvement and poor student performance. And the
schools are less equipped to respond to the needs of these students;
these students are more likely to experience a fragmented curriculum,
large classes, and low teacher expectations. 1'
The education of students in high poverty and racially isolated
schools is hindered by the effect of poverty on their families' ability to
provide an educationally supportive environment. There is
agreement that in both schools and in the larger society education
must be valued and encouraged for all children." Families,
communities, and schools must provide learning environments that
are supportive and inclusive. But this is nearly impossible to achieve
when communities and schools are overwhelmed by poverty.
The Benefits of Desegregation Mandate the Embrace of a New Model
As mentioned earlier in this article, there is disbelief surrounding
whether the efforts that have been made in this nation to democratize
education through desegregation actually worked. This disbelief fuels
the position of certain reformists who would abandon desegregation
efforts wholesale in favor of colorblind reforms. Understanding that
desegregation has produced both student outcome and societal
benefits is imperative to the mission of both the modest and radical
integrationists, and should serve to correct misapprehensions on the
part of reformists. Data on these impacts are provided here.
The positive effects of desegregation in the schools start with the
students but permeate far beyond the immediate environs of
100. Id.
101. Harvey Kantor & Barbara Brenzel, "Urban Education and the 'Truly
Disadvantaged': The Historical Roots of the Contemporary Crisis, 1945-1990" in The
"Underclass" Debate (1993).t
102. Philip T.K. Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the
Polemic of Legal Problems Be Overcome?, 43 DEPAuL L. REV. 1, 5 (1993) (citing JOHN
E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY
CONTROL 31 (1978)).
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students."3 Students of color "who attend more integrated schools
have increased academic achievement and higher test scores.' 4
These increases have been credited to, among other factors, better
resource access and enhanced motivation or competition. 5
Attending a more desegregated school translates into heightened
goals for future educational attainment and career, whereas being
educated in a racially segregated environment is associated with
lower educational attainment and career goals."°
An important benefit of a long-term desegregated education7 is
that students tend more to live in integrated environments as adults."
Hence, diverse educational settings contribute to students' ability to
participate in a pluralistic society. 9 A fifteen-year longitudinal study
comparing similar groups of minority students in Hartford,
Connecticut who did or did not transfer to the suburbs under a
voluntary desegregation program showed that those attending
suburban schools were considerably more likely to live in integrated
103. See generally, Michal Kurlaender & John T. Yun, Is Diversity a Compelling
Educational Interest? Evidence from Metropolitan Louisville (August 2000). available at
http:llwww.law.harvard.edulgroups/civilrights/publicationsLouisville.html.
104. Id. (citing R.L. Crain & R.E. Mahard, The Effect of Research Methodology on
Desegregation Achievement Studies: A Meta-Analysis, 88 AM. J. Soc., 839-854 (1983); R.L.
Crain, School Integration and the Academic Achievement of Negroes, 44 SOC. EDUC. 1-26
(1971)).
105. Id. (citing A.S. Wells & R.L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term
Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REV. EDUC. RES. 531-555 (1994); G. ORFIELD, G. &
S. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996)).
106. Id. (citing J. W. Schofield, Review of Research on School Desegregation's Impact
on Elementary and Secondary School Students in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION (J.A. Banks & C.A. McGee Banks eds., 1995); J. W.
Schofield, Maximizing the Benefits of a Diverse Student Body: Lessons from School
Desegregation Research, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED (Gary Orfield ed.. 2000); M.P.
Dawkins, Black Students' Occupational Expectations: A National Study of the Impact of
School Desegregation, 18 URB. EDUC., 98-113 (1983); J.W. Hoelter, Segregation and
Rationality in Black Status Aspiration Status, 55 Soc. EDUC. 31-39 (1982)).
107. Id. (citing J.H. Braddock, The Perpetuation of Segregation Across Levels of
Education: A Behavior Assessment of the Contact-Hypothesis, 53 SOC. EDUC. 178-186
(1980); J.M. McPartland & J.H. Braddock, Going to College and Getting a Good Job: The
Impact of Desegregation, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: EQUALITY,
QUALITY, AND FEASIBILITY (W.D. Hawley ed., 1999).
108. Id. (citing A. S. Wells & R.L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term
Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REv. EDUC. RES. 531-555 (1994)).
109. Id. (citing Patricia Gurin, The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education,
Expert Report for University of Michigan pending lawsuit Gratz & Hamacher v. Bollinger
(1999)).
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communities as adults.110
The Institute on Race and Poverty conducted a qualitative study
that demonstrates many more benefits of an integrated environment
than achievement, such as school enjoyment, increased understanding
among students, improved student teacher relationships, greater
interracial understanding, increased interracial interaction later in
life, and better preparation for a diverse work world."'
Other research has shown that the benefits of school
desegregation extend into housing desegregation. A study of 960
school districts found that cities which implemented metropolitan-
wide desegregation plans experienced substantially increased housing
integration, an effect evident in districts of all sizes and in all regions
of the country.' Districts that have experienced desegregation over
the longest period of time have the lowest levels of housing
segregation as well.' School desegregation between 1968 and 1973
doubled the rate of housing integration in twenty-five central cities
with an African American population of at least 100,000.114
With Brown, we as a society recognized the harm implicit in a
system ordered on supremacy of some and subordination of others.
Indeed, this harm is not limited to negative impacts on students'
achievement, but reaches into and damages our democratic structure
- reifying racial subordination in employment, health, wealth access,
and political participation. Research has shown that the system can
be altered for the good. Yet today still, we are in the position of
having to ask: Have the negative effects of segregation and
subordination ever been truly disestablished? Importantly, we have
to consider the harms of segregation on both subordinated groups
and whites, as Toni Morrison has suggested. 5
110. ROBERT L. GRAIN, THE LONG-TERM EFFEcrs OF DESEGREGATION: RESULTS
FROM A TRUE EXPERIMENT (1986).t
111. Institute on Race and Poverty, Education Integration Initiatives Project (May 2000)
(on file with the author).
112. Karl Taeuber, Desegregation of Public School Districts: Persistence and Change,
PHI DELTA KAPPAN, September 1990, at 18-24.
113. Diana Pearce, Breaking Down Barriers: New Evidence on the Impact of
Metropolitan School Desegregation on Housing Patterns, Nat'l Inst. of Educ. (1980).f
114. Diana Pearce, Robert L. Crain, & R. Farley, Lessons Not Lost: The Impact of
School Desegregation on the Racial Ecology of Large American Central Cities, (Apr.
1984) (paper presented at the American Educational Research Association Annual
Meeting, New Orleans).
115. See generally, MORRISON, supra note 55.
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Integration and Other School Reforms
Many education reformists have recently been pursuing reforms
that function in two ways with integration efforts: (1) they actively
disregard integration as a strong value in our schools; or (2) they foil
integration efforts by focusing on the need for choice or quality. The
implication is that integration no longer remains a primary or even
secondary goal in education. In the next sections, I review the
implications for the creation of a radically integrated society of
multiple popular school reform strategies, including separatist
schools, educational choice programs, standardized testing, vouchers
and charter schools, curricular reform, and teacher training.
Reformists often go further than advocating their position and
denigrate desegregation while pushing for choice and other reforms.
The rhetoric is often fueled by charges that desegregation efforts had
no positive effect on students of color, and even harmed them. In the
words of Doris Wilkinson, "[p]ublic school integration and the
associated demolition of the black school has had a devastating
impact on African-American children - their self-esteem, motivation
to succeed, conceptions of heroes or role models, respect for adults,
and academic performance.
1 6
This approach fails to consider the social context and power
structure of segregated education. Further, it blames desegregation
without contemplating the potential for equity in education under a
far-reaching, transformative model of integration. Martha Minow has
written about this scapegoating of equality-oriented reforms by
choice advocates, stating that "[r]acial desegregation, school finance
litigation, special education, and bilingual education may be once
proud names of prior school reforms, but now they often are blamed,
directly or indirectly... "for the performance of schools.'
I question the logic of the assumption on the part of certain
reformists that a segregated school is now acceptable. First, we know
that without integration, the other values of education cannot be
achieved for all students, especially those students who most need the
additional support strong schools provide. Second, the assumption
mistakenly accepts that a segregated education can be effective.
What is an effective segregated education? Research has shown
that the characteristics of a segregated education include the
concentration of poverty, a depression in resources and teacher
116. Doris Y. Wilkinson, Integration Dilemmas in a Racist Culture, 33 SOC'Y NO. 3,
Mar. 1996, at 27-28.
117. Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257,259 (1999).
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training in the schools, higher teacher turnover rates, and the
perpetuation of prejudicial attitudes on the part of students."8 These
characteristics are not those of an effective educational environment.
B. The Antagonism of Certain Reforms to the Goals of Integration
Proponents of some education reforms disregard the impact
reforms may have on integration efforts, in effect accepting
segregation. But one thing should be clear: there should not be a
choice between integration and education reform. Modest and
radical integrationists do not want to disregard the benefits of certain
reforms. Indeed, some reforms can support desegregation, and
integration can help further certain reforms. We can have both
educational reform and desegregation, but in order to accomplish this
we must determine which reforms are antagonistic to desegregation
and which are cooperative with desegregation and, more largely,
integration. Though I approach this subject from the radical
integrationist position, in considering whether reforms are poised to
cooperate with the goals of integrationists, I consider whether the
goals of even the modest integrationist may be satisfied.
Separatist Schools
One position gaining popularity and the backing of political will
in many communities of color that pit school reform against the goals
of integration is that deliberately racially homogeneous (i.e., racially
separated) schools can serve students of color well. That is, that a
good education can be had in a racially isolated environment, if
118. john a. powell, Segregation and Inadequacy in the Twin Cities Public Schools, 17
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 255, 257 (1996) (describing concentrated poverty as an
outcome of segregation in the schools); see also Jomills H. Braddock, The Perpetuation of
Segregation Across Levels of Education: A Behavioral Assessment of the Contact-
Hypothesis, 53 Soc. EDUC. 178-86 (1980)t; Jomills H. Braddock, Quality and Equality:
Compatible or Incompatible Goals?, 63 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 3, 166 (1981); Stephen J.
Caldas & Carl Bankston III, The Inequality of Separation: Racial Composition of Schools
and Academic Achievement, 34 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 533, 534 (1998); John I. Goodlad &
Jeannie Oakes, We Must Offer Equal Access to Knowledge, 18 EDUC. RES. 16-22 (1988);
Eric A. Hanushek, The Impact of Differential Expenditures on School Performance, 18
EDUc. RES. 45-51, 62 (1989); Eric A. Hanushek, A Jaundiced View of "Adequacy" in
School Finance Reform, 8 EDUC. POL'Y, 460-69 (1994); Eric A. Hanushek & Lori L.
Taylor, Alternative Assessments of the Performance of Schools: Measurement of State
Variations in Achievement, 25 J. HUM. 179-201 (1990); DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE
UNDERCLASS (1993); NICHOLAS J. MURGO & TAMMY K. WALSH, PREDICTIONS: FROM
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER SALARIES TO STUDENT OUTCOMES (1993); WILLIAM L.
SHARP, COLLECrIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1993)t.
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funding is directed to the schools and reforms are implemented. John
Sibley Butler talks about the potential of a recrudescence of the
tradition in the African American South of "self-help," by which he
means the independent creation of African American schools and
other community institutions.119 Self-help, Butler explains, is built on
the principle that getting a quality education is more important than
whether that education is desegregated or segregated." Butler
reports that students who attend all-black schools are more
compelled to strive for achievement and less "concerned with the
attitudes of whites.",
21
But separating institutions only covers up the historical and
present-day causes of racial disparities, and must as a strategy be
rejected: "Self-renewal is critical to black progress. But so is a
concerted, biracial attack on the social and economic causes of black
disadvantages and alienation. The truth is that we cannot solve
America's racial problems separately, for at the root of those
problems is separation itself.""l
A useful point of comparison in the discussion of the viability of
separatist education is separatist housing. There are racially
homogeneous suburbs that, though middle class and bearing the
semblance of an economic stability that bucks the notion that poverty
travels with race, in fact stand on the brink of economic meltdown.
Sheryll Cashin analyzed such a scenario in Prince George's County,
Maryland which is touted as a successful exercise in separatism - "the
highest per-capita income, majority black jurisdiction in the United
States. ' 2' Cashin's study of this county revealed that its proximity
and open doors to neighborhoods populated by low-income African
American families, its inability to attract new jobs, and its failure to
capture other new economic growth will result in crisis. 4 In fact, this
suburb is experiencing a decline in property values, an increase in
child poverty, more numerous incidents of crime, lower standardized
test results, and an increase in the population of low-income students
because the suburb is unable to contend with the external forces, the
119. John Sibley Butler, The Return of Open Debate, 33 Soc'Y No. 3, Mar. 1996, at 11-
18.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 18.
122. Vernon E. Jordan, Black America: Looking Inward or Outward? 33 SOc'Y No. 3,
Mar. 1996, at 25.
123. Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 729.732 (2001).
124. Id.
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dynamics beyond its borders, that create and continue to foster
racialized economic inequality.12
For the same reasons, separatist schools may initially prosper,
but unless they are equipped with the tools to contend with outside
forces, they will likely grow in their populations of high need students
and ultimately face great crises. Moreover, separatist schools do not
disturb the supremacist structures that limit attainment of democracy
for people of color and whites.
Accountability
One reform that has increased in its popularity but does not pose
benefits in terms of integration is accountability as presently
conceived. Accountability measures include performance awards
aimed to improve student performance by offering school or teacher
incentives and board certification from the National Board for
Professional Teaching Standards." But measures such as
performance awards do not provide help to urban schools that
already struggle against fewer resources, greater challenges, and the
resulting lower student achievement. As such, these types of reform
do not align with the goal of integration, even that embraced by
modest integrationists. Viewed from the radical integrationist
position, current accountability measures are problematic in that they
leave untouched subordinating structures, and measure the wrong
outcomes. An appropriate accountability measure would have racial
justice as its first and chief gauging factor, creating an umbrella for
the consideration of the participatory nature of educational decision-
making, the capacity of the school system to allow for self-
constitution outside of a language and reality of subordination, and
the potential of the structure to produce citizens aware and critical of
privilege and racial hierarchy. Accountability measures as now
conceived do not command their salvaging in the framing of a new
model of education and justice.
Standardized Testing
High stakes standardized tests continue to be touted as reform
125. Id. at 37-38, 41-42, 47, 50-51, 58 (citing MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A
REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 19,38, and generally (1999)).
126. See Adam Urbanski & Roger Erskine, School Reform, TURN, and Teacher
Compensation, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 367-70 (Jan. 2000), available at
http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kurb0001.htm; see also Michael Fullan, The Three Stories of
Education Reform, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 581-84 (Apr. 2000), available at
http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kful0004.htm.
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mechanisms but have been shown to be more detrimental to low-
income student of color outcomes than they are beneficial. Research
has shown that students of color, those with disabilities, and low-
income students tend to have lower passage rates on the standardized
tests that determine grade advancement and graduation." ' Beyond
bias in the drafting, a well documented issue, and disparities in
outcomes, concerns for students of color are that the institution of
high stakes testing may lead students to drop out under self-imposed
pressure and be encouraged to drop out by administrations eager to
present a positive portrait of testing results."n And tests increase the
retention rate (i.e., the rate at which students are held back) for
students of color in major metropolitan school districts, which is the
"single strongest predictor of whether students will drop out."'29 A
further concern for students of color attending schools in urban
settings is that the pressures associated with poor outcomes may lead
experienced teachers to leave these urban schools."
Tests have not even been shown to improve educational
outcomes generally. The 1980s experienced a surge of standardized
testing and assessment; the largest effort was the New Standards
Project (NSP). It was found that these tests offer little to no
reliability or generalizability, seldom take into account the variety of
learning styles, and are often found to be racially and culturally
biased."' Despite such evidence, standardized testing as a means to
improve educational "excellence" still maintains popular support.
Proponents of high stakes testing point to several potential
advantages for students of color in public schools: that testing
increases teacher and student motivation, functions to eliminate
tracking by standardizing expectations of students, and can provide
the impetus to targeting for improvement low-performing schools
that are attended predominantly by low-income students of color.'
Evidence to support these claims has not been put forth by
127. For a review of outcome disparities in different states, see Jay P. Heubert,
Graduation and Promotion Testing: Potential Benefits and Risks for Minority Students,
English Language Learners and Students with Disabilities, 9 POVERTY & RACE No. 5,
Sept./Oct. 2000 at 1-2, 5.t
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Elizabeth Spalding, Performance Assessment and the New Standards Project. A
Story of Serendipitous Success, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, (June 2000), available at
http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kspa0006.htm.
132. Heubert, supra note 129 at 5-6.
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proponents, however.
For reasons similar to those given for a restructuring of
accountability measures, above, testing must be transformed before it
is retained.
Tracking
Tracking is another exampli of a seemingly performance-
oriented school reform effort that we now know foiled desegregation
efforts and caused great harm. Introduced in the 1920s, tracking was
almost obsolete by the time of Brown. But immediately after Brown,
schools used tracking to segregate students of color - creating
segregated schools within schools:
The Brown decision is directly correlated with the re-
introduction of tracking as a system of academic classification.
Tracking was reintroduced into American school systems for
two reasons. First, it was an effort by Southern states to dilute
the effects of the Brown decision. Second, it was a response by
Northern school systems to the influx of African-American
students caused by the large-scale migration of African-
American families from the South. Schools reacted to orders to
desegregate by putting in place tracking systems as a means to
place African-American and White students in different
classrooms 33
This reform effort was explicitly used to foil desegregation.
Tracking operated to hold students of color back from their full
potential, to keep them from becoming full citizens and informing
citizenship, and also perpetuated whites' participation in a
supremacist structure. Tracking, still pervasive in educational
institutions, continues to produce short- and long-term educational
outcome and attainment level disparities by race and class.
Neighborhood Schools
Neighborhood schools are another "innovation" and are
antagonistic to the goal of racial and economic integration. Although
they have the benefit of potentially allowing increased parental
involvement, in communities and families where poverty is high, it is
often impossible for parents to become involved at target levels. In
addition to producing inconsistent results as regards parental
involvement, neighborhood schools reinforce racial and economic
133. Angelia Dickens, Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: How Tracking has
Resegregated America's Public Schools, 29 COLUM. L.J. & SOC. PROBS. 469, 474-77
(1996).
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isolation by leaving residential segregation untouched.
Neighborhood schooling is a detrimental reform type, also, in that its
implementation masks the fact that racial hierarchy has been
inscribed into residential patterns - allowing, instead, families to
believe that they have exercised a choice in housing and, therefore, a
choice as to which schools their children will attend. This falsity
attaches strongly to the reform of neighborhood schools.
From the perspective of the modest integrationist, neighborhood
schools are troubling because they do not promote numerical
desegregation nor equivalency in student outcomes. The radical
integrationist problematizes this reform structure as well because the
reversion to residence-determined attendance means a return to pre-
Brown isolation of students of color from democracy-promoting
structures.
It is questionable whether any of the above strategies can indeed
improve the education of all students unless they are implemented
within desegregated, or better still, integrated schools. Moreover,
"[tlhe new reforms expose children to new risks of inequality by
leaving some students in dismal existing schools and making crucial to
the selection of children's schools the parents' and guardians'
motivation and knowledge - qualities that are most certainly not
equally distributed.""
Educational Choice Programs and Vouchers
Turning to the choice-based models, from the perspective of the
modest integrationist, it is clear that any model of school choice
reform that could be salvaged from the current set of reforms would
have to counter the disparities in information, resources, and other
elements of capacity to choose. At present, "[t]here is greater
evidence that white students are better able to use choice to transfer
from integrated urban schools to all-white suburban schools." 35
The desire on the part of modest integrationists for improved
student outcomes for all students is not met by the choice-based
reform of vouchers. Vouchers are supported by those who point to
studies that suggest improved achievement for African American
students. In fact there is little empirical evidence of a positive impact
134. Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 257, 260-61
(1999).
135. Philip T.K. Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the
Polemic of Legal Problems Be Overcome? 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1993) (citing
James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L. J. 259,259 (1991)).
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on achievement.3 6 Many researchers conclude that vouchers will
compound the disparity between thriving and struggling districts."'
One study found that "information levels regarding the voucher
program were much higher among white parents with higher incomes,
and the parents' educational backgrounds proved to be an especially
important factor.'
138
There are problems beyond the application stage. The extent to
which transportation is provided under a school choice program can
limit the choices of students of color and low-income students to
attend the school of their choice. School districts may only provide
transportation within their own district, or within a limited range.'39
For families without cars with which to drive students to schools out
of bus reach, choice is constrained. And the families that tend far
more to not own cars are low-income families of color.
To contextualize vouchers, and truly gauge whether this reform.
should be salvaged in the development of a new model, it is important
to realize that they emerged at the time of gains in school
desegregation, and served to provide white students a way out of
desegregated schools. "After the unanimous decision in Brown,
many southern states attempted to create state-supported voucher
systems for white families who sent their children to segregated
private schools."'14 Because vouchers first emerged as a tool of racial
subordination, and their value as regards integration seems limited
even today, vouchers likely would not survive to take a place in a new
model of racially just school reform, from either the position of the
modest or radical integrationist.
Charter Schools
Like vouchers, charter schools were used to foil desegregation
efforts. After Brown, southern states "created parental choice
136. ALEX MOLNAR, SCHOOL 'CHOICE,' WISCONSIN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
EDUCATIONAL ISSUES SERIES, available at
http:llwww.weac.orglresource/nor96/vouchers.htm (1996); see also Kim K. Metcalf & Polly
A. Tait, Free Market Policies and Public Education: What is the Cost of Choice? PHI
DELTA KAPPAN (September 1999), available at
http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kmet9909.htm.
137. MOLNAR, supra note 138.
138. Daniel, supra note 137, at 33 (citing Amy Stuart Wells, Choice in Education:
Examining the Evidence of Equity, 93 TEACHERS C. REC. 137,147-50 (1991)).
139. Id. at 15 (citing MINN. STAT. § 120.062 subd. 9 (1993) (describing the limited
transportation requirements of school districts under Minnesota school choice law)).
140. Id. at 4 (citing Henry M. Levin, Market Approaches to Education: Vouchers and
School Choice, 11 ECON. EDUC. R. 279,280 (1992)).
programs for public schools which technically permitted African-
Americans and whites to transfer out of segregated school systems
but which provided neither incentives for the legal apparatus to
dismantle centuries of state-supported discrimination.' ' 4' Charter
schools at this time did not in fact create choice for African American
students. "Hostile white administrators, teachers, and students who
sought to dissuade African-American enrollment at the all-white
public schools confronted those who desired to transfer."'4 Though
the charter school movement now wears the semblance of race
neutrality, "[p]arental choice in the 1950s and 1960s [] came to be
linked to the perpetuation of segregation."''
Even now charter schools are problematic because regulations as
to admissions practices are not race conscious. This can lead to
increased segregation at the school level, with parents of
predominantly white students tending to have the resources to seek
out and apply to charter schools, and parents of color confronting
prohibitive application and admissions practices. "Rather than
generating a desirable pluralism of methods and values, vouchers and
charters could instead produce self-segregation that exacerbates
intergroup misunderstandings along the familiar fault-lines of race,
class, gender, religion, disability, and national origin."' 44  A
transformative approach to equity in education would require
confronting and dismantling the subordinating mechanisms of charter
schools: to reach the more instrumental goals of modest
integrationists and go beyond, to an ignition of the transformation
called for by radical integrationists.
C. Cooperation between Reform and Integration
Discussions regarding desegregation and integration often
portray them in opposition to other types of school reform, when in
fact true integration embraces many reform strategies. School reform
efforts that cooperate with desegregation include reductions in class
sizes and improvement of teacher quality. While many of the current
school reform proposals have potential, none will make a broad
impact on its own. Therefore, two critical items must be addressed:
141. Id. (citing Amy Stuart Wells, Choice in Education: Examining the Evidence of
Equity, 93 TEACHERS C. REC. 137, 140 (1991)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Minow, supra note 136, at 269 (citing KEVIN B. SMITH & KENNETH J. MEIER,
THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE: POLITICS, MARKETS, AND FOOLS 76-77 (1995)).
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(1) a well-planned, multi-pronged approach is the only way to impact
the complex issues facing our education system today, and (2)
ensurance that such an approach occurs for all of our children.
True or radical integration is the vehicle to accomplish both of
those tasks. True integration addresses the issues of achievement,
opportunity, community, and relevancy at a systemic level. Through
a transformative process, the school system becomes a place of
learning and growth for students and teachers through innovative
curriculum, technology, teaching practices, and administration, as
well as a broad cultural understanding and application of that
understanding. These instrumental advances then create a grounding
for the more far-reaching goals of the radical integrationist, who
seeks to build upon the transformation of the school setting to the
recreation of a truly democratic society.
At the site of curricular reform, true integration requires a
multicultural curriculum that is incorporated into daily work, and not
merely added on or reserved for study during a special month, such as
Black History Month. Another reform that cooperates well with
integration, and enhances integration, is reduction in class size.
Although disputed regarding its impact on achievement, class size has
been shown to improve relationships and ameliorate student and
teacher satisfaction. Third, success can be had through better teacher
training and the development of a more racially and ethnically
representative faculty.
IV. Conclusion
As we examine the history and current condition of education,
and we reestablish what we want our system of public education to
achieve for our citizens, we must ask some difficult questions. Is
providing a quality education for all children rather than only a
specific and ever decreasing segment of our society what we want?
Are the crippling issues of racism and socioeconomic bias as they
pertain to education worthy of addressing? Surely the answer to both
questions must be yes. As Martha Minow exhorts:
Schools afford an arena for fighting about what kind of society
we should be, how the old and new generations should relate,
whether commerce should govern democracy or democracy
shall govern commerce, and how individual freedoms should be
rendered compatible with the common good. It is imperative
that the new round of school fights center as much on the
symbols of inclusion and equality as upon the rhetoric of
individualism and quality. These values need one another so
that the whole is at least as worthy as the sum of its parts, if not
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
perhaps more so. 14 5
Desegregation and integration are vital mechanisms to take
positive action toward the difficult questions raised above. Certainly
the deeper value of constituting ourselves into a true democracy and
a society where racial justice is a reality is beyond the reach of these
reforms and the instrumental claims of the modest integrationists.
Some will argue that is utopic and we must pursue more modest
goals. I have serious doubts that, given the relational nature of racial
hierarchy, instrumental goals can be achieved without a broad attack
on the very underpinnings of this structure: it is not enough to change
black and brown test scores; as Dr King recognized, it is necessary to
change the heart.46
It may be as James Baldwin wrote, that as long as you think you
are white, there is no hope for you.47 Without integration no reform
can work effectively because it will not be distributed to all students
nor will it be done in an embracing and diverse environment. We
must recognize that intent is not necessary to exact harm. By turning
away from desegregation and integration efforts, we are exacting a
tremendous harm not only on all of our children and our minority and
impoverished children, especially, but also on our aspirations to
become a real democracy. I have argued in this paper that we cannot
move beyond what Professor Omi calls a racial dictatorship to a racial
democracy by simply relying on a flawed notion of choice.
Educational reform in the U.S. has a tendency to move from one
effort to another in a pendular fashion, while retaining little of the
beneficial aspects of the prior effort, whether in curriculum (e.g.,
phonics and whole language) or systemic issues (e.g., desegregation
and neighborhood schools).'48 In this pattern of subscribing to the
reform in vogue, policy makers and others of influence seem to lose
sight of the greater goal of education and what we need to provide for
all of our students in order for them to become productive citizens,
not just workers or consumers. We need an approach that does not
just focus on the next new approach, or how to deal with the latest
"crisis," - what is often a reactionary rather than a thoughtful
response.'49 Often these strategies are only available to suburban,
145. Id. at 287-88.
146. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRENGTH TO LOvE 22 (1963).t
147. "JAMES BALDWIN, THE PRICE OF THE TICKET 362 (1985).
148. See generally, Minow, supra note 136, at 257.
149. See Gregory J. Cizek, Give Us This Day Our Daily Bread& Manufacturing Crises in
Education, PHI DELTA KAPPAN (June 1999), available at
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wealthier, whiter schools and leave behind the already struggling
urban schools. As a society, we need to reestablish our societal goals
for education. Perhaps at its most basic, our goal for education is to
prepare our children for a full life in our democracy. This can only be
accomplished if we create a system that reflects these values,
effectively and consistently delivering them.
In attempting to satisfy the goals of the modest integrationists
(i.e., in seeking the equitable delivery of education) we must not as a
society become satisfied. Rather, we must embrace integration not in
a manner limited to what it can produce for learners, but for how it
can escalate our society into a forum of truly pluralist engagement.
This article is not against reform or choice but asserts that
education must be considered in terms of justice. And if we are
focused on democracy and justice, the role of true integration will be
expanded, not diminished. I believe when we give up on integration
properly understood, it is only a short time before we have
abandoned our commitment to a true democracy in our increasingly
pluralistic society.
http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kciz9906.htm.
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